Current state: In-progress
Discussion thread:
JIRA:
{
"access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.
eyJzdWIiOiJndWVzdCIsImF1ZCI6InRva2VuYmFzZWQiLCJpc3MiOiJLTk9YU1NPIiwiZXhwIjoxNDkzNTM4MjY1fQ.
FHsIdhlCi_h61PEXoKSbIEp5AlnVe9U5uEgcp7ktmVS8kLClFD2dj0KS-8sSnvNiPYdyZhEvxqNhjmhqXMd2YQz97O6FUSGf69_
lmarJPjz9K_6sDgrgpZnVQhUfHUG3k6-zetqzKZhu3gZYVLfu36TXb3C62TfXIrPF2qI9psM",
"target_url":"https://localhost:8443/gateway/tokenbased",
"token_type":"Bearer ",
"expires_in":1493538265484
}
It is possible that the above could be used to represent multiple token types by adding additional token_type values for the client to interrogate and handle appropriately.
Of course, a client should request a token from a KnoxToken service that is configured to provide the desired token.
Perhaps, we limit an endpoint to a single token_type or we could configure a single service endpoint to service requests for certain types and rely on the client to ask for the desired one and default to current 'Bearer' type.
Where 'Bearer' implies our Knox JWT token.
Other potential types would include things like S3 or AWS tokens.
We may also want to consider base64 encoding the token for certain types.
Clients would have to know whether it needs to be decoded based on the type.
Currently, Header based Preauth provider has IP address validation as the only built-in validator for establishing trust.
In addition, 2-way ssl can be used to establish trust at the gateway level. This also ensures that clients are trusted.
We should add a validator that verifies a signature based on a shared secret.
The secret must be provisioned on the Knox side as an alias in a credential store for protection.
As part of a some token exchange scenarios a special token may be acquired and used in a redirect URL to establish an SSO session.
This allows for redirection where headers are not guaranteed to be sent with the redirect and cookies may run into CORS related issues.
Especially for trust relationships, we don't always want to trust just any client cert that has been issued by a trusted CA.
Therefore, we need to be able to specify exactly what clients we trust.
Instead of requiring every authorization point across the platform to configure LDAP information for
Hadoop Group Mapping needed for authorization checks, we can provide a central place to get the groups for a given user.
By providing this central API and add a client for it to the Hadoop Group Mapping we can help simplify configuration and
management of this necessary lookup across the entire platform.